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THE CONDITIONING BIAS TO
OUT-GROUPS
In classical fear conditioning, a neu-
tral stimulus, once paired with an aver-
sive event for several times, can induce
fear reaction by itself. Compared with
fear-irrelevant stimuli such as birds and
butterflies, fear-relevant stimuli such as
spiders and snakes are more readily asso-
ciated with aversive events. This prepared
learning phenomenon is highly resistant to
extinction, insensitive to cognitive manip-
ulations, and could be acquired in only
one trial (Seligman, 1971; Öhman and
Mineka, 2001). From an evolutionary per-
spective, human beings and non-human
primates are predisposed to learn to fear
spiders and snakes because such prepared-
ness conferred a selective advantage to our
ancestors over conspecifics that were not
prepared.
Inspired by recent studies that showed
overlapping neural systems underlying
racial bias and fear conditioning (Phelps
et al., 2001; Olsson and Phelps, 2004;
Olsson et al., 2005), tested whether pre-
pared learning can be extended to a
socio-cultural context. They employed the
differential conditioning paradigm that
consisted of three phases—habituation,
acquisition, and extinction—presented in
sequence (Öhman and Mineka, 2001).
The conditioned stimuli (CS) were two
pictures of Black individuals and two
pictures of White individuals. During
habituation, all pictures were presented
without reinforcement. During acquisi-
tion, one of the pictures from each race
(CS+) was accompanied by an electric
shock (the unconditioned stimulus, US),
whereas the other (CS-) was not. During
extinction, no shocks were administered.
The conditioned fear response (CR) was
obtained by subtracting participants’ skin
conductance responses (SCRs) to the CS-
from their SCRs to the CS+ for each race.
The main result was that the CR to racial
out-group faces persisted whereas the CR
to in-group faces was fully extinguished in
the absence of the US.
AVAILABLE EXPLANATIONS AND
THEIR SHORTAGES
The finding for racial faces resembles the
pattern observed for spiders and snakes,
indicating that racial out-group faces may
serve as a signal of social threat and be
processed in a manner similar to fear-
relevant stimuli. However, it may be too
early to conclude that the conditioning
bias to out-groups could be considered as
a typical prepared learning phenomenon.
Theoretically, the evidence that human
populations differentiated into different
races recently in evolutionary history
because of geographic isolation of differ-
ent lineages makes it unlikely that humans
could have evolved mechanisms specifi-
cally to learn to fear different races, since
being genetically prepared to learn to fear
other races could not provide any selec-
tive advantage (Maia, 2009). In the mean-
time, to be regarded as an instance of
prepared learning, an association has to
fulfill not only the criterion of resistance
to extinction, but also the criteria of one
trial learning and insensitivity to cogni-
tive manipulations. However, researchers
have found that the conditioning bias
to out-groups was abolished by cogni-
tive manipulations. During the extinction
phase, such bias disappeared once the
experimenter informed participant that no
more electric shocks would be presented
and the shock electrode was removed from
participants’ arm (Mallan et al., 2009).
Recently, a theoretical analysis argued
that the conditioning bias to out-groups
could be explained by standard learn-
ing theory (Maia, 2009). Specifically, the
author suggested that the conditioning
bias to out-groups might be mediated by
a mechanism called latent inhibition. That
is to say, a familiar but unassociated stim-
ulus takes longer to acquire meaning (as a
signal) than a new stimulus. In the inter-
group context, people are generally famil-
iar with their in-groups, so they needmore
time to associate their in-groups with the
unconditioned stimuli. During the same
acquisition time, this association would
not become so strong as the association
between the unfamiliar out-groups and
the unconditioned stimuli. As a result, it
would also be easier to extinguish. The
pattern of Olsson et al.’s (2005) findings
was indeed consistent with this account.
Besides the finding that the CR to out-
groups remained significant after extinc-
tion, the CR to out-groups also appeared
to be stronger than the CR to in-groups
during acquisition, although no explicit
comparison was done in Olsson et al.’s
(2005) study.
In our opinion, although it is not
appropriate to consider the conditioning
bias to out-groups as preparedness and
use the evolutionary account to explain it,
the latent inhibition view does not pro-
vide a convictive explanation, either. For
example, a very recent research using the
minimal group paradigm found that after
arbitrarily assigned to different groups
according to a trivial criterion (e.g., per-
ceptual style), participants more readily
learned a fear response when an aversive
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stimulus was paired with out-group faces
than when it was paired with in-group
faces (Navarrete et al., 2012). That is to
say, the CR to out-groups was stronger
than the CR to in-groups during acquisi-
tion. However, unlike Olsson et al.’s (2005)
results, the CRs to both in-groups and out-
groups were fully extinguished during the
extinction phase. Latent inhibition could
not explain why the CR to out-groups
were stronger than the CR to in-groups
in that the two groups were both formed
in the lab, having little difference in their
familiarity, and thus should not result in
different learning rate.
Indeed, Olsson et al. (2005) also
questioned the evolutionary account but
instead argued that sociocultural learn-
ing about the identity and qualities of
out-groups provided the basis for per-
sistence of the CR to out-groups. That
is to say, repeated exposure to negative
information about out-groups might pre-
pare people to fear newly encountered
out-group members. Similar idea has also
been advanced by other researchers very
recently (Mallan et al., 2013). This account
seems evolutionarily more plausible and
has a potential to reconcile the extin-
guished CR to out-groups in the minimal
group paradigm (Navarrete et al., 2012).
However, these researchers did not elab-
orate the specific underlying mechanism.
In the meanwhile, this account still has a
limitation to explain the reduced CR to in-
groups during acquisition (Olsson et al.,
2005; Navarrete et al., 2012).
A NEW ACCOUNT
We think in order to provide a more
complete explanation, we have to take
into account the theories and findings
in the area of intergroup relation-
ship. Traditionally, research in this field
appeared to accept, at least implicitly,
the idea that relationships between in-
groups and out-groups were characterized
by antagonism, conflict, and mutual con-
tempt. As a result, the favoritism toward
in-groups and the derogation toward out-
groups were studied interchangeably, as
if they were two sides of the same coin.
Recently, more and more researchers
began to re-consider this issue and sug-
gested in-group favoritism and out-group
derogation were separable phenomena
(e.g., Brewer, 1999; Hewstone et al., 2002).
For example, most minimal group stud-
ies rating the in-group and the out-group
separately found that categorization into
groups led to positive in-group ratings
in the absence of negative out-group rat-
ings (Brewer, 1979). Further, the positive
in-group bias found in the allocation of
positive resources (e.g., money) using the
minimal group paradigm disappeared
when negative outcomes (e.g., noise)
were distributed (e.g., Mummendey et al.,
1992), suggesting humans are willing to
differentially benefit the in-groups rather
than harm out-groups. Recent research in
developmental psychology (e.g., Aboud,
2003) and social neuroscience (e.g., Van
Bavel et al., 2011) provided further sup-
porting evidence for this perspective.
Indeed, researchers even found that group
formation and positive in-group regard
had intragroup origins and did not require
comparison with a contrasting out-group
(Gaertner et al., 2006).
According to this new perspective,
in-group favoritism arises from a self-
anchoring mechanism such that self-
evaluation could automatically extend to
in-groups. As recent research revealed,
personal trait self-esteem is positively cor-
related with in-group favoritism and this
association holds not only when the in-
group and the out-group are equiva-
lent (i.e., classed only by a trivial cri-
teria) but also when the in-group is
objectively less favorable than the out-
group (Gramzow and Gaertner, 2005).
Because people generally have a good view
of themselves, they would automatically
transfer such positivity to the percep-
tion regarding their in-groups. For exam-
ple, using a typical paradigm measuring
spontaneous trait inferences in a mini-
mal group setting, Otten and Moskowitz
(2000) demonstrated that behaviors that
implied positive traits about an in-group
member were more likely to be catego-
rized in a manner consistent with the
implied trait. However, there was no facil-
itation of trait inference to out-group
members performing negative behaviors,
suggesting there was evidence for implicit
in-group favoritism but not out-group
derogation.
In contrast, out-group derogation
occurs when the very existence of the
out-group, or its goals and values, are
seen as a threat to the maintenance
and the social identity of the in-group
(Brewer, 2007). The integrated threat
theory (Stephan and Stephan, 2000)
distinguishes four different sources of
experienced threat from a specific out-
group: realistic threat (threat to in-group
physical and psychological well-being),
symbolic threat (threat to the stability of
in-group values and beliefs), intergroup
anxiety (personal discomfort arising from
actual or anticipated interactions with out-
groups), and negative stereotypes (beliefs
about out-group characteristics implying
unfavorable interactions and negative con-
sequences). Following studies supported
this model by showing that these threat
perceptions (especially the first three per-
ceptions) significantly predicted negative
attitudes toward out-groups and medi-
ated the effects of other predictors such as
intergroup contact (Stephan et al., 2002).
Thus, the conditioning bias to out-
groups may relate to the mechanism
underlying in-group favoritism and out-
group derogation. On one hand, since
individuals tend to automatically trans-
fer the positive view of themselves to
their in-groups, either novel ones (e.g.,
formed arbitrarily in a lab) or real ones
(e.g., Blacks or Whites), their in-groups
would be rated more positively than their
out-groups. When in-group faces and
out-group faces serve as CS, in-group
faces, initially positive stimuli, would need
more time to acquire an aversive mean-
ing (Zanna et al., 1970). Consequently, the
CR to in-group faces would be weaker
than the CR to out-group faces during
the acquisition phase. Such inferences are
indeed consistent with both Olsson et al.’s
(2005) findings (using racial groups) and
Navarrete et al.’s (2012) findings (using
minimal group paradigm).
On the other hand, out-groups would
generally be rated neutral if the out-
group does not pose a threat to the
in-group. Previous research revealed that
the CR to fear-irrelevant neutral stimuli
could be extinguished during the extinc-
tion phase (Seligman, 1971). That is also
what Navarrete et al. (2012) found in a
minimal group setting. However, under
certain conditions (e.g., when high con-
flict between groups occurs), out-groups
would be rated negatively because they
are perceived as a threat to in-groups.
In Olsson et al.’s (2005) study, they used
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two racial groups, Whites and Blacks.
Obviously, these two racial groups shared
a history of discrimination, prejudice, and
even war. The racial issue is still sensi-
tive and tense in today’s America and both
groups hold a negative attitude toward
each other. Since fear responses to CS that
already have a negative valence are easier
to acquire (Zanna et al., 1970) and thus
harder to extinguish, there is no wonder
that these authors found the CR to out-
groups failed to be extinguished. Although
this analysis shares some features with the
sociocultural learning process proposed by
Olsson et al. (2005) and Mallan et al.
(2013), it provides more details and spec-
ifies when and how the CR to out-groups
persists.
Certainly, this account needs to be
tested empirically. We think there are three
initial ways to do it. First, future stud-
ies could examine it using real groups
(e.g., racial groups) by adding mea-
sures of in-group favoritism and out-
group derogation. We predict in-group
favoritism would be negatively corre-
lated with the CR to in-groups during
acquisition whereas out-group derogation
would be positively correlated with the
CR to out-groups during both acquisi-
tion and extinction. Second, since in-
group love is the extension of people’s
personal self-esteem, it is natural to infer
that weaker CR to in-groups during acqui-
sition would occur only for individuals
with higher self-esteem. State self-esteem
could be manipulated to test this hypoth-
esis. Third, we could also adapt the mini-
mal group paradigm by manipulating the
relationship between in-groups and out-
groups. Our hypothesis is that if there
is a conflict between arbitrarily assigned
groups, the conditioning bias, just as what
Olsson et al.’s (2005) reported using racial
groups (i.e., stronger CR to out-groups
during acquisition and remaining CR to
out-groups during extinction), would be
found.
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